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ABSTRACT
It is an established fact that investors favor the familiar—be it domestic securities or, within a
country, the securities of nearby firms—and avoid investments that would provide the greatest
diversification benefits. While we do not rule out familiarity as an important driver of portfolio
allocations, we provide new evidence of investors’ international diversification motive. In particular,
our analysis of the security-level U.S. equity holdings of foreign and domestic institutional investors
indicates that institutional investors reveal a preference for domestic multinationals (MNCs), even
after controlling for familiarity factors. We attribute this revealed preference to the desire to obtain
“safe” international diversification. We then show that holdings of domestic MNCs are substantial
and, after accounting for this home-grown foreign exposure, that the share of “foreign” equities in
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fang.cai@frb.govOver the past decade, there has been a surge of research on international portfolio 
allocation.  Theoretical work in this literature often begins by noting the empirical fact 
that investors underweight foreign securities.  For example, Figure 1 depicts a prime 
motivation in both Stulz (2005) and van Nieuwerberg and Veldkamp (2005), that 
investors are biased against foreign equities (where bias means that their allocations are 
less than those given by market-cap weightings).  Empirical work in this literature often 
aims to understand why global investors favor (or neglect) certain countries, where 
again ‘favor’ is defined relative to a market-cap-weighted allocation.  For example, this 
under-/over-weighting relative to market-cap weights is at the heart of the empirical 
analysis in Gelos and Wei (2005), Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005), Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz, and Williamson (2003), and Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004).  All of these 
papers neglect the potentially important point that investors might obtain substantial 
international diversification at home. 
  We utilize a unique security-level dataset to show that if one changes the basis 
for defining a firm to be ‘foreign’ from the location of the firm’s headquarters to the 
locations of its operations, the home bias that many papers are predicated on is greatly 
reduced.   Our  analysis  shows  that  institutional  investors  overweight  domestic 
multinationals (MNCs) relative to purely local domestic firms.  That is, institutional 
investors favor precisely the domestic firms that may provide the greatest international 
diversification benefits.   
  The  finding  that  investors  prefer  domestic  stocks  that  provide  greater 
diversification  benefits  is  important  because  evidence  for  investors’  diversification 
motives is scarce.  There has been abundant academic evidence that investors favor the  
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familiar and avoid investments that would provide the greatest diversification benefits. 
The home bias literature itself owes its origins to the fact that investors overweight the 
familiar (domestic securities) at the expense of the less known foreign stocks (French 
and Poterba, 1991).  Even within their foreign portfolios—however small those foreign 
portfolios  might  be—investors  prefer  the  stocks  of  foreign  countries  that  are  closer 
(Portes and Rey, 2005) and whose equity markets are more, not less, correlated with 
their own (Chan, Covrig, and Ng, 2005).  Within countries, foreign investors prefer 
large, familiar stocks (Kang and Stulz, 1997; Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001).  Even 
within their domestic portfolios, investors show a strong preference for the familiar 
(Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Huberman, 2001) and 
tend to shun stocks that are less correlated with the rest of their portfolio (Giannetti and 
Siminov, 2005)—exactly those stocks that would provide the greatest diversification 
benefits.
1 
  In  this  paper  we,  too,  find  ample  evidence  that  investors  favor  the  familiar.  
Foreign  investors  overweight  large  firms,  those  that  trade  the  most, and  those  with 
foreign operations—just the firms one could reasonably expect foreigners to know more 
about.  But more importantly, we also find interesting evidence of the international 
diversification motive.  We find that domestic institutional investors show a distinct 
preference for domestic multinationals.  One could argue that these MNCs are large, 
well-known firms, and that this finding is merely more evidence of the important role of 
familiarity.  But even after we control for size, inclusion in a major index (S&P500), 
tradability of the firm’s product, and turnover, the preference for domestic firms that 
                                                 
1   Of  course,  there  are  good  reasons  for  investing  in  the  familiar.  In  a  Markowitz  (1952)  world, 
diversification  is  optimal,  but  we  do  not  live  in  such  a  world.  In  an  environment  of  market 
imperfections investing in the familiar can have its advantages, be it abnormal returns from investing 
locally (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001) or private benefits to control (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Nenova, 
2003).  
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have  overseas  operations  remains.    Given  the  potential  presence  of  a  discount  to 
corporate  international diversification
2 and  given  that  we control for  many  common 
familiarity-type variables, this preference for domestic MNCs appears to be evidence of 
the hard-to-document diversification motive.   
  The finding of a diversification motive comes from our analysis, as of two points 
in time (March 2000 and December 1994), of the security-level U.S. equity holdings of 
domestic institutions (obtained from SEC Form 13-f data) and, for the first time in the 
literature,  foreigners  (obtained  from  comprehensive  benchmark  surveys).    These 
portfolio regressions then motivate us to rethink how holdings of “foreign” equities are 
typically calculated, and this leads to the second main contribution of this paper: We 
show that the home bias puzzle is overstated by quantifying the foreign exposure U.S. 
investors obtain through the holdings of U.S. MNCs.   
  The domestic preference for firms that themselves are internationally diversified 
implies that U.S. investors have substantial claims on cash flows that originate from 
non-U.S.  operations.    Reported  statistics  on  international  equity  positions  are  not 
designed to capture these indirect foreign holdings.  One  way  to  compute  the  foreign 
exposure obtained from holding domestic MNCs is to reconsider the notion of country 
and redefine the term foreign.  A firm’s country is typically defined by the residence of 
its corporate headquarters—Procter & Gamble (P&G), because it is headquartered in 
Cincinnati, is a U.S. firm—but one could also define a firm’s country by the location in 
which it operates.  For many firms, the two definitions would produce identical country 
attributions.  But some firms would be residents of many countries in a way determined 
by the distribution of their operations around the world.  For example, P&G, with about 
                                                 
2  See Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) and, for an alternative view, Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop (2003).  
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half of its sales originating from U.S. operations, would still be a primarily U.S. firm, 
but would also be part Filipino, part Argentinian, and a bit of the other 67 countries in 
which it operates.
3 
  In  that vein, one estimate of  the dollar  value of foreign  exposure  gained  by 
investing  in  domestic  firms—which  we  call  home-grown  foreign  exposure—is 
produced by summing, across each U.S. firm, the product of U.S. investors’ holdings of 
its equity and the percent of its sales that originates from foreign operations.  This 
estimate requires firm-level data on holdings of domestic equities, which we form by 
subtracting foreigners’ holdings (obtained from the same benchmark survey utilized in 
the first half of the paper) from market capitalization.  We calculate the sum to be $3.5 
trillion as of March 2000, which, when added to the $2 trillion reported in published 
measures of U.S. investors’ holdings of foreign equities, increases the share of “foreign” 
equities in U.S. investors’ equity portfolios to 32%, a sharp increase from the officially 
reported 12%.  Counting foreign holdings in this manner would nearly eliminate the 
home bias puzzle. 
  However,  $3.5  trillion  likely  overstates  the  dollar  value  of  foreign  exposure 
obtained  through  these  domestic  firms  and  should  be  considered  an  upper-bound 
estimate.  Returns are determined primarily in an equity’s trading market (Jacquillat and 
Solnik, 1978; Chan, Hameed, and Lau, 2003; Grammig, Melvin, Schlag, 2003), so from 
a returns-perspective P&G will look to a large extent like an NYSE-based equity.  Thus, 
the  diversification  benefit  P&G  provides  U.S.  investors  is  not  simply  given  by  the 
extent of its foreign operations.  To account for this, we use an international factor 
model, similar to that in Griffin (2002), to calculate for each firm the extent to which its 
                                                 
3  We distinguish operations (i.e., having production facilities) from exports.  
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foreign beta varies with the amount of its foreign operations.  The factor model suggests 
that a more refined estimate of home-grown foreign exposure is one half of the $3.5 
trillion.  Adding this to direct holdings of foreign equities puts the share of foreign 
equities in U.S. investors’ portfolios at about 21 percent, substantially greater than the 
traditionally reported 12 percent.  Home bias still exists, but it appears to be much less 
than standard data would suggest. 
  Moreover, we argue that foreigners’ preference for U.S. MNCs could also be 
evidence of the diversification motive, but in another way.  While firm-level data on the 
location  of  foreign  operations  is  not  available  to  us,
4 aggregate  data  indicates  that 
foreign  equity  investors  reside  predominantly  in  industrial  countries,  whereas  U.S. 
firms’ foreign operations are disproportionately in emerging markets.  Here, because of 
data  limitations,  we  are  reduced  to  conjecture,  but  foreigners’  preference  for  U.S. 
multinationals could indicate a desire for “safe” diversification in risky markets. 
  One way to view our paper is as the completion of the important story begun in 
Errunza, Hogan, and Hung (1999).
5  Errunza et al. showed that it is possible to obtain 
substantial international diversification at home.  By analyzing actual portfolio holdings, 
we are able to show that the types of firms Errunza et al. had in mind are preferred by 
domestic  investors,  indicating  that  in  practice  the  home-grown  foreign  exposure  is 
substantial.  Errunza et al. suggested that the home bias might be overestimated; we 
complete the story by showing that it is. 
  The paper proceeds as follows.   The next  section describes the data sets  on 
foreign and U.S. institutional holdings of U.S. equities and shows that both foreigners 
                                                 
4 Access to detailed firm-level data on U.S. companies’ foreign operations is limited to employees of the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
5 See, also, Rowland and Tesar (2004).  
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and domestic institutions reveal a preference for global firms.  Section II then quantifies 
the home-grown foreign exposure that investors obtain through holdings of domestic 
equities.  Section III concludes. 
I. The Preferences of Domestic Institutions and Foreigners 
  In this section we analyze the preferences of domestic institutions and foreigners 
as they are revealed in the composition of their U.S. equity portfolios.  Similar to the 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) study of Swedish equities, this analysis can be seen as 
encompassing country-level studies of foreigners’ holdings—such as the investigations 
of foreigners’ positions in Japan (Kang and Stulz, 1997) and Finland (Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2001)—and studies of the preferences of domestic institutions (Falkenstein, 
1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2000). 
 
A. Dependent Variables and Sample Selection 
  Following  Gompers  and  Metrick  (2000)  and  Falkenstein  (1996),  we  define 
ownership  as  holdings  divided  by  market  capitalization  as  of  the  dates  of  the  two 
benchmark  surveys,  end-March  2000  and  end-December  1994.    Specifically,  let 
subscript i denote a U.S. firm and superscript F or I denote foreign or institutional 
investors.  Define 
F
i Own as the dollar amount of foreigners’ holdings of firm i’s equity 
(
F







Own = ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Ownership by domestic institutional investors,
I
i Own , is similarly defined.  In a cross-
sectional study such as ours, variations in these ownership measures are observationally  
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equivalent to variations in deviations from a market-capitalization-weighted portfolio.  
For  example,  let  foreigners’  deviations  from  a  market-capitalization-weighted  U.S. 
equity portfolio,
F







= w ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
where
F H and W MCap  are  foreigners’  total  equity  holdings  and  world  market 
capitalization, respectively.  For each firm i,
F
i w  is just 
F
i Own  divided by a constant, 
W
F MCap H / .  Thus, our regressions can be interpreted as identifying factors associated 
with  deviations  from  a  market-capitalization-weighted  benchmark  such  as  the 
international CAPM. 
  Data on foreigners’ holdings of U.S. stocks are from comprehensive benchmark 
surveys conducted by the U.S. Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve System as 
of December 1994 and March 2000.  The data are confidential and are collected from 
two types of reporters: issuers of securities and, because issuers typically do not have 
information on the ultimate owner of their securities, U.S. custodians that manage the 
safekeeping of U.S. securities for foreigners.   Custodians—primarily banks but also 
some broker-dealers—are the main source of information, reporting 87 percent of the 
market value of foreign holdings of U.S. long-term securities measured on the 2000 
survey; all U.S. custodians that held at least $20 million in U.S. securities for foreigners 
were  required  to  submit  survey  data.    Reporting  on  the  survey  is  mandatory,  and 
penalties may be imposed for noncompliance.  Because most U.S. securities are in the  
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possession of U.S. custodians for safekeeping and all significant U.S. custodians were 
included in the surveys, the survey data are the most comprehensive available.
6 
  For  data on  the  holdings of  domestic institutional investors—banks,  brokers, 
insurance companies, mutual funds, and pensions—we rely on the Spectrum database.  
The Spectrum data are compiled from SEC 13-F filings, which institutions with greater 
than $100 million of securities under discretionary management are required to submit.  
The 13-F filings are quarterly; we use data on the two quarters that correspond with our 
survey  data  of  foreigners’  holdings,  fourth  quarter  1994  and  first  quarter  2000.  
Gompers and Metrick (2001), among others, have analyzed the 13-F data and provide a 
complete description. 
  To be included in our study, we require a firm to be listed on NYSE, Amex, or 
Nasdaq and have market capitalization data in CRSP as of a survey date.  That leaves us 
with 5,980 firms for 2000 and 5,533 firms for 1994.  To guard against data errors, we 
further require that the market capitalization from CRSP differ by no more than 20 
percent  from  data  provided  through  the  benchmark  survey,  when  available.    That 
                                                 
 
6 The surveys provide high quality, security-level data, but they have two drawbacks.  First, the 
data collection technique does not permit identification of the type of foreign investor beyond whether the 
investor is a government or a private entity.  Since governments do not typically hold other countries’ 
equities, we can assume the foreign holdings in our sample are those of private investors.  Moreover, it is 
likely that the representative foreign investor is an institution, but there is no concrete evidence supporting 
this.  Second, the country attribution of foreign investment in U.S. securities is far from perfect, 
precluding an analysis of, say, Germans’ investment patterns in U.S. equities.  The distortion in country 
attribution in the survey is caused by instances in which multiple custodians are involved in the 
safekeeping of a security.  For example, a resident of Germany may buy a U.S. security and place this 
security in the custody of a Swiss bank.  To facilitate settlement and custody operations, the Swiss bank 
will then normally employ a U.S.-resident custodian bank to act as its foreign subcustodian for this 
security.  When portfolio surveys are conducted, the legal authority to collect information extends only to 
U.S.-resident entities.  The U.S. resident bank acting as the subcustodian of the Swiss bank will report this 
security on the survey, but this U.S. bank will typically know only that it is holding this security on behalf 
of a Swiss bank and will report this security as Swiss- held.  Because of this custodial center bias, we do 
not use information on the residence of the foreign investor in our empirical work. A detailed description 
of the methodology, as well as results from the latest survey, is in Treasury Department et al. (2002), 
available at www.treas.gov/tic/fpis.html.  For a primer on the surveys, see Griever, Lee, and Warnock 
(2001).  
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eliminated 163 firms in 2000 and 220 in 1994.
7  Foreign and institutional ownership that 
in  sum  exceeds  100  percent  of  the  outstanding  shares  indicates  a  data  error;  this 
criterion eliminates no firms in 2000 and 67 in 1994.  In multivariate regressions, we 
use data on firm characteristics from CompuStat, which reduces our sample to 5,330 
firms in 2000 and 4,690 in 1994, comparable to the 5,199 firms in the end-1996 sample 
in Gompers and Metrick (2001).  We then gather data on the amount of a firm’s sales 
that  originates  from  foreign  operations  from  Worldscope,  because  it  has  greater 
coverage  for  this  variable  than  Compustat’s  Geography  file;  including  foreign  sales 
reduces our sample by 787 firms in 2000 and 1,907 firms in 1994.
8  Our final working 
samples in the years 2000 and 1994 are 4,543 and 2,783, respectively. 
 
B. Explanatory Variables 
  We focus on one variable, Foreign Sales, the percent of a firm’s sales that are 
derived from foreign operations.  In general, but especially for domestic investors, this 
variable captures any preference for multinationals.  From the perspective of foreigners, 
Foreign Sales might also proxy for information or familiarity; foreigners likely have 
better quality information about, or are more familiar with, the “nearby” U.S. firms with 
foreign operations.  
  We  incorporate  many  “familiarity”  variables  that  should  help  explain  the 
holdings of domestic institutional investors and foreigners.  These familiarity variables 
include: 
Size: log market capitalization as of the survey date (March 2000 or December 1994); 
                                                 
 
7 To assist in the editing of the benchmark surveys, the U.S. government purchases vendor data 
on prices, shares outstanding, and market capitalization.  Not every record contains this information, 
however, so we cannot make this comparison with CRSP for every security. 
 
8 Our results do not hinge on whether we treat firms that have no foreign sales data as having 
zero foreign sales, or discarding them, as we do in our regression analysis.  
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S&P 500: an indicator variable set equal to one if the equity is in the S&P 500 index; 
Turnover: the value of trading over the previous 12 months over market capitalization; 
Tradable: an indicator variable set equal to one if the firm has any exports. 
 
The familiarity roles of Size, S&P 500, and Turnover should be clear.  Larger firms, 
those  in  a  major  index,  and  those  that  are  traded  more  often  are  more  familiar  to 
investors.   Tradable, in the  spirit of  Coval and Moskowitz (1999), also proxies for 
familiarity; in the simplest sense, if its product can travel, the firm is familiar to more 
people.  One should note the distinction between Foreign Sales, which refers to foreign 
operations,  and  Tradable,  which  refers  to  the  exports  stemming  from  U.S.-based 
production.  Of the 4543 firms in our main regressions, 1851 have foreign operations 
(i.e., have a positive value for Foreign Sales); of those, only 377 also export from U.S.-
based operations (i.e., have a value of one for Tradable).  To describe the distinction 
another  way,  Foreign  Sales  concerns  where  the  firm’s  production  is  located,  while 
Tradable concerns whether its product crosses national borders. 
  We also include other control variables that regularly appear in the empirical 
literature on the equity holdings of domestic institutions and foreigners.  Kang and Stulz 
(1997)  and  Dahlquist  and  Robertsson  (2001)  provide  a  short  list  of  factors  that 
foreigners might prefer.  The studies of Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick 
(2001)  provide  factors  that  influence  the  composition  of  domestic  institutions’ 
investments  in  U.S.  equities.    Similar  to  these  studies,  we  include  the  following 
variables:
9 
Dividend Yield: dividend per share over the year-end market price; 
                                                 
 
9  All explanatory variables are from CompuStat, with the exception of Foreign Sales and 
Tradable, which are from Worldscope, and returns-based variables, which are computed from CRSP data 
on returns.  
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Book-to-market: the book value per share over the year-end market price; 
Momentum: cumulative monthly returns over the preceding one-year period; 
Leverage: the ratio of total debt to total equity; 
Beta: the systematic risk of a stock; 
Volatility: the standard deviation of the residual.
10 
 
The control variables are intended to capture a range of investor preferences.  Prudential 
considerations might prompt some institutions to prefer firms that pay dividends and 
have low volatility (Del Guercio, 1996).  Investors who prefer growth firms might show 
an affinity for stocks with low dividends (as revenues are plowed back into the firm) or 
low book-to-market.  The predicted sign of Beta is ambiguous; Kang and Stulz (1997) 
note that, in the presence of proportional barriers to investment, foreigners should hold 
high beta stocks, but such barriers should not pertain to the U.S. market.  Momentum 
will  provide  an  indication  of  whether  investors  can  be  characterized  as  momentum 
traders.  Leverage is included as a measure of long-term financial health. 
 
C. Empirical Results 
  Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table I.  In our full sample 
of 4,543 firms, the median firm is a growth firm (book-to-market of 0.49) that pays no 
dividends, is not in the S&P 500, has 4 percent foreign ownership and 29 percent of its 
shares held by U.S. institutions, and does not produce a tradable good or have foreign 
                                                 
 
10 Beta and volatility are computed from a market model that is estimated using monthly returns 
over the preceding four-year period.  
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operations.
11  It also has a market capitalization of $171 million (= e
5.14), a turnover rate 
of 0.86, and liabilities that are 115 percent of its equity.  In the slightly smaller samples 
(due to data availability), the median firm had 12-month returns of 5 percent with a beta 
and  residual  variance  (calculated  over  a  48-month  period)  of  0.84  and  0.14, 
respectively. 
  Simple bivariate correlations are presented in Table II.  The first two columns 
indicate  that 
F
i Own and 
I
i Own are  both  positively  related  to  size,  liquidity,  S&P 
inclusion,  beta,  and  foreign  sales,  and  negatively  related  to  book-to-market  and 
leverage.  In contrast, they differ in their relations to volatility, dividends, tradable, and 
momentum; foreign holdings are greater in firms with higher volatility, lower dividends, 
and greater past returns, whereas domestic institutional ownership is greater in firms 
that paid higher dividends and had less volatile returns (consistent with the prudential 
considerations of Del Guercio (1996)), but is unrelated to past returns.  While the simple 
correlations  in Table II suggest  that domestic  institutions shy away  from  firms  that 
produce  a  tradable  good,  we  caution  against  reading  too  much  into  these  bivariate 
relationships.   
  Table III shows our multivariate regressions of ownership by foreign investors 
(left panels) and domestic institutional investors (right panels) for our samples in 2000 
and 1994.  Because preferences can change over time—for example, at times investors 
might  prefer  growth  stocks,  at  other  times  value  stocks—we  denote  with  bold 
coefficients that are significant in all four regressions for a particular type of investor.  
We first report results of regressions that include a parsimonious set of variables and 
                                                 
 
11 Note that, while the minimum investment by foreigners or institutional investors rounds to 
zero percent, there are only 8 firms in our sample for which foreign or institutional holdings are truly 
zero.  
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maximum sample size (4,543 firms in columns 1 and 5) before adding CRSP returns 
variables  with  less  coverage.    In  some  cases,  the  preferences  revealed  by  these 
regressions change across samples.  For example, for foreigners, S&P500 is not in bold 
because, controlling for size and the other listed factors, foreigners showed a preference 
for  S&P  500  firms  in  2000  but  not  in  1994.    However,  some  characteristics  come 
through strongly in all regressions for a type of investor.  For example, the regressions 
reveal a preference by foreign investors for high-growth, high-risk U.S. firms about 
which  they  have  sufficient  information;  specifically,  they  prefer  U.S.  firms  that are 
large, liquid, pay low dividends, have volatile returns, and have high foreign sales.  The 
right-panel  regressions  show  that  domestic  institutional  investors  show  consistent 
preferences for firms that are large, not in the S&P 500, and have high book-to-market, 
less volatile returns (perhaps for prudential reasons), and high foreign sales.
12   
  Our  regressions  indicate  a  common  preference  for  internationally  diversified 
firms,
13 which  extends  results  from  the  Dahlquist  and  Robertsson  (2001)  study  of 
Swedish equities, in which size was the only common preference.  We note, however, 
that while both Foreign Sales and Size are statistically significant in all specifications, 
their economic impacts are markedly different for foreign and domestic institutional 
investors.    Table  IV  shows  the  impact  on  ownership  of  a  move  from  each 
characteristic’s 25
th percentile value to its 75
th percentile value.  All entries in the table 
are the percentage point change in ownership expressed as a share of median ownership.  
The  economic  importance  of  size  is  very  large  on  both  foreign  and  domestic 
                                                 
 
12 The unconditional correlations in Table 3 show that domestic institutional investors’ holdings 
are indeed positively related to S&P inclusion.  Table 4 shows, however, that after controlling for size 
there is no evidence of a positive index inclusion effect. 
 
13 This does not necessarily mean that all other groups of investors show a significant aversion 
to firms with high foreign sales.  We cannot say much about the positions of other investors because they 
are a diverse group consisting of, among others, individuals, insiders, and hedge funds.  
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institutional ownership.  Moving from the 25
th percentile of size to the 75
th percentile 
increases foreign ownership by 23 percent (of median foreign ownership) and domestic 
institutional ownership by 84 percent of median.  In contrast, the economic importance 
of  foreign  sales  is  much  larger  for  foreign  investors  (15  percent  as  compared  to  3 
percent). 
  Finally,  we  note  that  domestic  investors’  preference  for  MNCs,  even  after 
controlling  for  size  and  many  other  characteristics,  could  be  considered  surprising, 
especially  given  the  many  papers  that  conclude  that  corporate  international 
diversification is value-destroying.
14  But it is consistent with a “safe diversification” 
hypothesis.    Specifically,  investors  might  prefer  to  obtain  foreign  exposure  through 
firms  from  countries  with  strong  shareholder  protections  (in  this  case,  the  United 
States).  For  example,  the  large  institutional  investor,  CalPERS,  will  not  invest  in 
Universal  Robina,  because  shareholder  protections  in  the  Philippines  are  not  strong 
enough for it to make its permissible country list.  But CalPERS obtains at least some 
exposure to the Philippine market through its $600 million of holdings in P&G equity.  
Foreign investors could also be driven by this motive.  In particular, to some extent, 
foreign investment in the equity of U.S. firms originates in different countries from 
those that have U.S. firms’ foreign operations, suggesting that foreigners might hold 
multinationals to get exposure to other foreign markets.  Specifically, Table V, which 
shows the country distributions of holdings of U.S. equities by foreign investors and 
U.S. direct investment abroad, indicates that a disproportionate amount of U.S. firms’ 
foreign  activity  is  in  emerging  markets  (21  percent,  compared  to  emerging  market 
holdings of U.S. equities of only 6 percent).  Foreign exposure through multinationals 
                                                 
 
14 See, for example, Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002).  The surveys of Fatemi (1984) and Bodnar, 
Tang, and Weintrop (2003) indicate that this is the subject of considerable debate.  
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could be preferred to direct foreign holdings if investor protection regulations are weak 
or weakly  enforced  in  some countries, as  suggested by  the work of La Porta et al. 
(2000).  
  In the next section we estimate the extent to which reported data on foreign 
equity holdings should be modified to take into account “safe diversification” or, more 
generally, home-grown foreign exposure. 
II. Home-Grown Foreign Exposure and the Home Bias 
  Graphs like Figure 1 are often used to motivate home bias studies.  Such figures, 
however, do not take into account how much international diversification is obtained 
through domestic investors’ holdings of domestic multinationals.  In this section, we 
quantify the home-grown foreign exposure by first showing that the foreign exposure 
that a domestic firm provides U.S. investors increases with the share of its sales that 
originates  abroad,  and  then  calculating  the  dollar  amount  of  home-grown  foreign 
exposure.  The end result from this section is a redrawing of the typical home bias 
graph—a redrawing that shows that the home bias puzzle is overstated. 
 
A. The Exposure of Domestic Firms to Foreign Equity Markets 
   Recent evidence indicates that a security’s returns are determined primarily by 
the  market  in  which  the  security  trades,  rather  than  by  the  location  of  the  firm’s 
operations (Chan, Hameed, and Lau, 2003; Grammig, Melvin, Schlag, 2003).  In light 
of  this,  it  is  conceivable  that  firms  with  more  extensive  foreign  operations  do  not 
provide investors with greater international diversification benefits.  In this subsection, 
to ascertain the extent to which foreign factors influence the returns of U.S. equities, we  
  16 
first calculate each firm’s foreign beta by estimating an international market model and 
then show how foreign betas vary with foreign sales.   
  To compute firm i’s foreign beta (￿i,F), we follow Griffin (2002) and estimate an 
international market model with two components, a U.S. factor and a foreign factor.  
Specifically,  for  each  stock  in  our  sample,  we  estimate  the  following  international 
market model, using 48 months (April 1996 to March 2000) of returns data:
15 
                                t i t F F i t US US i i t i r r a r , , , , , , e b b + + + = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
where ri is firm i’s stock returns, rUS is the return on a CRSP value-weighted U.S. equity 
portfolio, rF is the return on a foreign equity portfolio, and ￿i,US is firm i’s domestic beta. 
  A crucial choice in this analysis is the weighting scheme for the foreign factor.  
The easiest weighting scheme would be derived from data on market capitalizations, 
enabling the use of a readily available equity index such as the MSCI World ex US.  
However,  this  choice  is  inappropriate  for  a  particular  firm  if  the  distribution  of  its 
foreign operations across countries differs greatly from the distribution of world equity 
market capitalization.  A better weighting scheme would be derived from firm-specific 
information, perhaps on the distribution of the firm’s foreign sales across countries.  For 
example,  consider  a  U.S.  firm  that  has  substantial  exposure  to  Latin  America.  
Professional  investors  know  this  and  purchase  its  equity  as  one  way  to  obtain  this 
exposure.  In this case, a conventional foreign equity index, such as the MSCI World ex 
US, which has a weighting on Latin America of 2 to 3 percent, would not likely uncover 
the  foreign  exposure  obtained  through  this  firm.    Because  firm-level  data  on  the 
distribution of operations across foreign countries are not available to us, we rely on the 
next best alternative, industry-specific trade weights developed in Goldberg (2004).  As 
                                                 
 
15 To be included in this regression, the firm must have at least 36 months of returns data.  Our 
results are similar if we restrict this regression to firms that have returns data for all 48 months.  
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shown in the appendix, these industry-specific weights differ from MSCI weights but 
should more accurately represent the countries in which the firm conducts business.
16 
   Table VI (Panel A) presents average results from the international market model 
estimates for the full sample of firms as well as four portfolios sorted by the extent of 
foreign sales.  The table shows that, across all firms for which data on foreign sales and 
at least three years of returns are available, the average domestic beta (0.757) is much 
larger than the average foreign beta (0.215), confirming that the returns of these U.S. 
firms  owe  predominantly  to  U.S.  factors.    The  importance  of  the  foreign  factor, 
however, increases with foreign sales: the average foreign beta for firms with no foreign 
sales is only 0.142, but it increases to 0.322 for firms with 25 to 50 percent foreign 
sales, and is 0.468 for firms with sales that originate primarily in foreign countries.  In 
contrast, there is no apparent relationship between domestic betas and foreign sales. 
  To form an estimate of the dollar value of home-grown foreign exposure, we 
require an estimate of the relationship between foreign sales and foreign beta.  To obtain 
this estimate we use weighted least squares, with weights that are the inverse of the 
standard error of each F i,
Ù
b , to estimate the following model: 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ i t FS F i es ForeignSal z g k b + + =
Ù
, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
The coefficient estimate of gFS of 0.490 (Panel B) indicates that firms with 10 percent 
greater foreign sales have foreign betas that are 0.049 higher, consistent with the results 
                                                 
 
16 See the appendix for further details on the industry-specific trade weights, which have been 
used by others to form trade-weighted exchange rates that have been applied to studies of the effect of 
exchange rates on corporate profits (Goldberg, 2004) and of firms’ exchange rate exposure (Ihrig and 
Prior, 2003).  For our purposes, weights of foreign operations might be preferable, but we cannot use 
BEA’s publicly available data on U.S. firms’ operations by country by industry because in many cases it 
is withheld for disclosure reasons.  The ideal weighting scheme would be the proportion of market value 
represented by the MNC’s non-U.S. operations and sales (Agmon and Lessard, 1977).  But firms do not 
regularly report profits and losses by location, so such a measure is not knowable to a researcher.  Our 
adjustment factor is consistent with estimates from the Brooks and del Negro (2004) factor model.  
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in Panel A.  As a robustness check—and because in the next subsection we will apply 
our  estimate  of  gFS  to  calculate  the  “foreign”  holdings  multinationals  provide—we 
investigate whether this result owes to a difference between firms with no foreign sales 
and those with some foreign sales.  It does not; the coefficient (gFS =0.533) is very 
similar for firms with positive foreign sales.   
  Our estimate of gFS in Panel B comes from a two-step approach that utilizes 
generated regressors (the F i,
Ù
b ) in the second step.  To the extent that the first step does 
not produce estimates that are independent across firms, the standard errors in (4) might 
be  biased.    A  one-step  approach  alleviates  this  issue.    Specifically,  in  Panel  C  we 
present results from a pooled fixed-effects panel model that encompasses both (2) and 
(4): 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ t i t F i F F t US US i i t i r es ForeignSal r a r , , , 1 , 0 , , , ) ( h b b b + + + + = ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
  We restrict estimation to include only those firms for which Foreign Sales is 
positive,  because  these  are  the  relevant  firms  for  our  calculations  of  home-grown 
foreign exposure.  The coefficient on what becomes an interaction term of Foreign Sales 
and rF is positive and highly significant, indicating that as in Panel A and B, as foreign 
sales increases, so does the foreign beta.
17  Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient 
(￿1,F=0.46) is nearly identical to the estimate of  gFS in Panel B. 
  Overall,  the  results  in  Table  VI  indicate  that  investors  do  obtain  increased 
international  diversification  benefits  through  U.S.  firms  that  themselves  are 
internationally diversified.  A firm’s returns depend primarily on the local market, as in 
(Chan, Hameed, and Lau, 2003; Grammig, Melvin, Schlag, 2003), so there is not a one-
                                                 
 
17 The results for the full sample are nearly identical.  
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to-one relationship between foreign sales and foreign exposure, but home-grown foreign 
exposure is substantial: Our regressions in Panels B and C indicate that, for every one 
percentage point of foreign sales, the firm’s foreign beta increases about a half of that.
18  
We use this estimate in the next subsection to quantify the dollar amount of home-
grown foreign exposure. 
 
B. The Dollar Value of Home-Grown Foreign Exposure 
  We estimate the dollar value of home-grown foreign exposure by weighting the 
dollar value of all U.S. investors’ holdings of U.S. equities by the percent of each firm’s 
sales  that  originate  from  foreign  operations.    Because  data  on  all  U.S.  investors’ 
holdings of individual U.S. equities does not exist, we form it by subtracting from firm 
i’s market capitalization the amount held by foreigners. 
  We start by biasing our estimate downward; for the firms in our sample that do 
not  have foreign  sales data  in  Worldscope  and  for all  firms  not  in  our  sample,  we 
assume  zero  foreign  sales.    After  subtracting  foreign  holdings  from  firm  market 
capitalization to get U.S. holdings, we weight U.S. holdings of U.S.-based firms by the 
degree  of  internationalization—the  percent  of  each firm’s  sales  that  originates from 
foreign operations—to get an upper-bound estimate of home-grown foreign exposure of 
$3,531 billion in March 2000 (Table VII).  The models in Table VI showed, however, 
that foreign exposure does not increase one-for-one with foreign sales.  Thus, we form 
model-based estimates by multiplying domestic holdings not by the weight of foreign 
sales, but by foreign sales times FS
Ù
g , which from equations (4) and (5) is roughly 0.5 for 
firms with positive foreign sales.  Our model-based estimates of the dollar value of 
                                                 
 
18 Our adjustment factor is consistent with the results in Brooks and del Negro (2004).  
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home-grown  foreign  exposure  are  therefore  0.5  times  our  upper-bound  estimate,  or 
$1,766 billion.
19 
  To gauge the importance of this magnitude, we also show in Table VII the dollar 
value of U.S. investors’ direct exposure to foreign equities.  An upper-bound estimate of 
this is the amount of foreign equities held by U.S. investors ($2,074 billion).  But, as 
with U.S. equities, the returns of some of those foreign equities will owe to U.S. factors 
and thus provide less than complete diversification benefits to U.S. investors.  A lower- 
bound estimate of the direct foreign exposure, formed by subtracting all of the foreign 
firm’s market capitalization attributable to foreign sales, is $1,343 billion.
20  Applying 
what we have learned from our model-based estimates of equations (4) and (5), more 
refined estimates would put direct foreign exposure at $1,891 billion, which assumes 
that 50 percent of the foreign sales of foreign firms originates in the United States and 
that  foreign  firms  have  the  same FS
Ù
g  of  0.5  that  U.S.  firms  have  (i.e.,  returns  are 
predominately determined in their home market).   
  At roughly $1.9 trillion, foreign exposure through foreign equities (direct foreign 
exposure) represents 11 percent of U.S. investors’ equity portfolios.  The international 
diversification that U.S. investors gain through their holdings of U.S. multinationals is 
comparable; including  home-grown foreign  exposure of $1,766  billion increases the 
foreign component of U.S. equity portfolios to 21 percent.  
                                                 
 
19 As a check of the reasonableness of our estimates, note that the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
estimate of the market value of U.S. firms’ foreign operations ($2,817 billion) lies between our upper-
bound estimate and our best guess of home-grown foreign exposure. 
 
20 This lower-bound estimate of direct foreign exposure is derived as follows.  Data from 
Ammer, Holland, Smith, and Warnock (2004) indicate that U.S. holdings of foreign equities weighted by 
foreign sales anywhere (not just in the United States) totaled about $360 billion in 1997, or 35 percent of 
overall foreign holdings.  If all of those sales were in the United States and the 35 percent rule still 
applied in 2000, $731 billion would be an appropriate estimate of the amount of U.S. investors’ direct 
foreign holdings that owed to operations in the United States.  
  21 
  To obtain a time series representation of this adjustment, as well as ascertain its 
implications  for  the  home  bias  of  other  countries,  we  can  apply  estimates  that  are 
consistent with the analysis in this section to published direct investment data.
21  Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA) data on foreign direct investment put the market value of 
U.S.  firms’  foreign  operations  at  $2.8  trillion  as  of  end-1999;  omitting  foreigners’ 
holdings  of  U.S.  multinationals  and  allowing  for  the  fact  that  the  returns  of  U.S. 
multinationals are primarily determined by domestic forces brought our model-based 
estimate of home-grown foreign exposure to roughly half that.  Thus to extrapolate our 
findings to other years, we add one half of reported direct investment stocks to reported 
foreign holdings.  We also adjust reported equity holdings downward by 10 percent, 
because  investors  hold  some  foreign  firms  that  have  a  substantial  presence  in  the 
domestic economy.   
  These adjustments produce the thin solid lines in Figures 2 and 3, which lie well 
above the previously reported holdings (dashed lines).  Including home-grown foreign 
exposure greatly reduces, but does not eliminate, the home bias puzzle. 
 
III. Conclusion 
  We  analyze  portfolios  of  U.S.  equities  and  find  that  foreigners  prefer  large, 
liquid, internationally oriented firms, consistent with previous studies.  Interestingly, we 
find  that domestic institutions also have  strong  preferences for  large,  internationally 
diversified firms.  We interpret the preference for domestic MNCs—which holds even 
                                                 
 
21Data availability precludes a rigorous study of the home-grown foreign exposure obtained by 
investors from other countries.  Returns data are available across a wide range of non-U.S. firms, so it is 
possible to estimate an international factor model.  But, to our knowledge, security-level data on domestic 
investors’ holdings of domestic equities are available for only a handful of countries (and even those are 
not available to most researchers).   
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after controlling for size, turnover, inclusion in a major index, and other indicators of 
familiarity—as evidence of the hard-to-document diversification motive.   
  The preference for domestic MNCs implies that U.S. investors obtain substantial 
international  diversification  through  their  holdings  of  U.S.  multinationals.    This  is 
confirmed using an international factor model that indicates that, while U.S. factors are 
most important for the returns of U.S. firms, the influence of foreign factors increases 
with the extent of the firm’s foreign sales.  We use the relationship between foreign 
sales and foreign beta to inform our estimate of the dollar value of home-grown foreign 
exposure, the foreign exposure U.S. investors obtain by holding U.S. equities.  The 
amount  of  home-grown  foreign  exposure  is  comparable  (in  dollar  value)  to  direct 
foreign  exposure  (through  holding  foreign  equities),  implying  that  the  international 
diversification of U.S. investors has been substantially underestimated. 
  It  must  be  noted  that,  while  our  results  suggest  that  typical  measures 
overestimate  the  extent  of  home  bias,  even  with  our  adjustments  a  substantial 
underweighting of foreign equities remains.  We suspect this owes primarily to the lack 
of  investor  protection  regulations  in  many  countries  and  the  fact  that  the  typical 
shareholder in many countries is a large insider (La Porta et al., 1999).  Foreigners’ 
investment in U.S. equities is not restricted by U.S. laws, but because the typical non-
U.S.  country  does  not  have  an  established  class  of  equity  shareholders,  foreign 
investment in the United States is limited.  Similarly, U.S. investors might fear investing 
in countries where the rules are not designed to protect outside shareholders.  Thus, if 
investor protection regulations are strengthened and more countries develop a class of 
equity shareholders, the home bias would likely decrease in both directions.  
  23 
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Appendix: Notes on industry-specific returns 
 
Our industry-specific returns use the industry weights developed in Goldberg (2004).  
For U.S. industries—20 two-digit manufacturing SIC codes and 10 nonmanufacturing 
groupings (Business Services, Construction, Educational Services, Film and Tape 
Rental, Financial Services, Legal Services, Insurance, Passenger Fares, Installation and 
Repair Services, and Telecommunications)—Goldberg (2004) provides the weight of 
each foreign country in each sector’s international trade and uses these time-varying 
weights to construct trade-weighted exchange rate indices. 
 
We use the industry weights to construct equity indices.  The weights for selected 
industries’ trade with the Euro area, Japan, emerging Asia, and Latin America are given 
in the following table, as are correlations of returns formed using the industry trade 




1996 Weights (%)    Returns Correlation 
  Euro 
area 








Tobacco (21)  31  23    9  8    0.95  0.75 
Chemicals (28)  28  11    14  12    0.92  0.79 
                 
Apparel (23)  8  10    37  30    0.74  0.71 
Leather (31)  16  7    48  16    0.66  0.67 
                 
memo:                 
 MSCI World exUS  20  35    12  3       
 
Note: For illustration purposes, weights shown are as of December 1996.  Correlations are computed 
using monthly returns for the period January 1995 - December 2000.  To conserve space, we do not 
present the weights and correlations for the other 26 industries. 
 
For  each  industry,  the  country  weights  based  on  international  trade  differ  from  the 
country weights in the MSCI World ex US index.  However, as the table shows, some 
have a similar mix between developed and emerging markets.  For example, the first 
two industries listed—Tobacco and Chemicals—are heavily weighted toward the Euro 
area and Japan, as is the MSCI index.  Not surprisingly, equity indices computed using 
country  weights  for  these  two  industries  are  highly  correlated  (0.95  and  0.92, 
respectively) with the MSCI World ex US index.  (For completeness, we also include 
the correlation with the MSCI US index.)  In contrast, Apparel and Leather are heavily 
weighted toward the emerging markets; as expected, their correlations with the MSCI 
World ex US are somewhat lower.   
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Table I: Basic Summary Statistics 
The sample size for all variables is 4,543, with the exception of Beta and Volatility (N=3,742).  
Own
F and Own
I are foreign holdings and U.S. institutional holdings, respectively, divided by 
market capitalization.  Size is the log of market capitalization.  Turnover is the average of 
twelve months of shares traded divided by beginning of month shares outstanding.   S&P is 
equal to one if the stock is in the S&P 500 index, zero otherwise.  Book-to-market is book value 
over market value.  Yield is dividends paid over a one-year period over beginning of period 
price.  Leverage is total liabilities divided by total equity.  Momentum is the cumulative returns 
over the preceding year.  Foreign Sales is the proportion of the firm’s sales that are abroad.  
Tradable is equal to one if the firm exports its product, zero otherwise.  Beta and Volatility are 
the systematic risk and residual variance from a market model calculated with monthly data for 
a four-year period.  Book-to-market, dividend yield, leverage, and turnover are winsorized at the 
1
st and 99
th percentiles.  The value of each variable at its 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th percentiles are 
presented in the columns labeled 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th.  Data are for 2000; statistics for 1994 are 
available upon request. 
 
Variable  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  25
th  50
th  75
th  Max 
Own
F  0.052  0.060  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.07  0.79 
Own
I  0.331  0.250  0.00  0.11  0.29  0.53  0.96 
Size  5.31  2.01  0.67  3.77  5.14  6.62  13.2 
Turnover  1.53  1.77  0.01  0.42  0.86  1.87  9.48 
S&P 500  0.076  0.266  0  0  0  0  1 
Book-to-
Market 
0.740  1.03  -0.76  0.17  0.49  0.93  7.21 
Yield  0.009  0.016  0  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.08 
Leverage  2.74  4.72  -9.93  0.45  1.15  2.74  24.2 
Momentum  0.674  2.04  -0.93  -0.23  0.05  0.72  34.2 
Foreign 
Sales 
0.124  0.204  0  0.00  0.00  0.20  1 
Tradable  0.164  0.370  0  0  0  0  1 
Beta  0.908  0.686  -4.14  0.46  0.84  1.27  6.27 
Volatility  0.162  0.104  0.033  0.09  0.14  0.20  1.353  
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Table II:  Cross Sectional Correlations 
The table shows the March 2000 cross-sectional correlation between ownership and firm characteristics and for all pairs of these characteristics.  P-




I  Size  Turnover  S&P   Beta  Vol  BM  Yield  Lev  Momentum  For. Sales 
Own
I  0.118 
0.000 
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Table III:  Determinants of Foreign and Institutional Ownership 
Table III presents regression results where the dependent variable is the share of security i held by 
foreigners (columns 1 - 4) or by domestic institutions (columns 5 - 8) as of March 2000 or December 
1994.   Reported are parameter  estimates,  with  p-values  computed  from  robust  standard  errors  in 
parentheses.  Bold type indicates estimates that, for a type of investor, are significant at the 10 percent 
level and the same sign in all four specifications.  Industry dummies corresponding to the Campbell 
(1996) grouping are included but not reported.  See Table I for definitions of explanatory variables. 
 
    Foreign Ownership  Institutional Ownership 
    2000  1994  2000  1994 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
















































































































































Beta    0.0007 
(0.704) 
  0.0038 
(0.012) 
  0.0292 
(0.000) 
  0.0074 
(0.215) 
Volatility    0.0255 
(0.055)  
  0.0391 
(0.000)  
  -0.7174 
(0.000) 
  -0.3023 
(0.096) 
N  4543  3742  2783  2214  4543  3742  2783  2214 
Adjusted R
2  0.532  0.557  0.531  0.537  0.802  0.837  0.827  0.849 
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Table IV:  The Impact of Characteristics on Foreign and Domestic Institutional 
Ownership 
Impact  on  ownership  of  a  shift  from  the  characteristic’s  25
th  percentile  to  its  75
th  percentile  is 
expressed  as  a  ratio  of  median  ownership.  Median  ownership  is 4  percent  for  foreigners  and  29 
percent  for  domestic  institutions.  Percentiles  are  given  in  Table  I.  Impact  is  only  computed  for 
variables that are significant and the same sign in every Table III regression for a given type of 
investor. Average coefficient estimates from 2000 are used to calculate impact; blank cells indicate 
that the characteristic’s coefficient is insignificantly different from zero in some regressions. For the 





















     
Size  0.23  0.84 
Turnover  0.33   
S&P dummy    -0.25 
Book-to-Market    0.05 
Yield  -0.08   
Leverage     
Momentum     
Foreign Sales  0.15  0.03 
Tradable dummy     
Beta     
Volatility  0.08  -0.27  
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Table V:  The Distribution of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad (USDIA) and Foreigners’ 
Holdings of U.S. Equities 
USDIA is end-1999 data valued at historical cost from the Bureau of Economic Analysis; the data are 
available online at www.bea.gov/bea/di/di1usdbal.htm. Shown are percent of total USDIA and total 
foreigners’ holdings of U.S. equities. 
 
  USDIA  Foreigner’s 
Holdings 
Emerging Markets  21.4  6.1 
  Latin America  10.2  0.9 
  Emerging Asia  7.8  4.0 
  Other Emerging  3.2  1.2 
Europe  50.4  57.9 
Canada  9.8  10.2 
Japan  4.5  8.5 
Caribbean Financial Centers  10.7  10.5 
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Table VI:  The Relationship between Foreign Exposure and Foreign Sales 
  Panel A shows the average regression results of the international factor model estimated for 
each stock over the period from April 1996 to March 2000: 
t i t F F i t US US i i t i r r a r , , , , , , e b b + + + =  
where ri is firm-specific stock returns, rUS is the return on a CRSP value-weighted US portfolio, and rF 
is the return on a firm-specific foreign portfolio.  The foreign portfolio uses a weighting scheme based 
on the Goldberg (2004) industry-specific trade weights.  Standard errors are in parentheses; these are 
computed as s(￿)/￿N, where s(￿) is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the coefficient estimates and 
N is the sample size.    
  Panel B shows the coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses) for the independent 
variables from cross-sectional weighted least squares regressions of the following form: 
i t FS F i es ForeignSal z g k b + + =
Ù
,  
where  F i,
Ù
b  is firm i’s estimated foreign beta from the international model and the weights are the 
inverse of the standard error of  F i,
Ù
b .  
  Panel C shows selected coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses) from the following 
fixed effects panel regression restricted to firms with positive foreign sales: 
t i t F i F F t US US i i t i r es ForeignSal r a r , , , 1 , 0 , , , ) ( h b b b + + + + =  
Panel A  N  |a|  ￿US  ￿F  Adj. 
R
2 
           
Full Sample  2852  0.019  0.757  0.215  0.088 
Subsamples                    
  with Foreign Sales           
    above 50%  266  0.020  0.795  0.468  0.118 
    between 25% and  558  0.018  0.781  0.322  0.119 
    between 0% and 25%  598  0.016  0.829  0.175  0.107 
    Zero  1430  0.021  0.711  0.142  0.059 
           
Panel B  N  Foreign 
Sales 
     
           
Full Sample  2852  0.49       
    (0.000)       
Subsample with           
  Non-zero Foreign Sales  1422  0.53       
      (0.000)       
           
Panel C    ￿0 ,F  ￿1, F     
  1410  0.1191  0.46     
    (0.000)  (0.000)      
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Table VII:  The International Equity Exposure of U.S. Investors 
Data are as of March 2000.  For home-grown foreign exposure, the upper bound estimate is computed 
as U.S. holdings (that part of the market capitalization not held by foreigners) times the percent of 
sales that is generated by foreign operations.  The model based estimates utilize results in Panels B 
and C of Table VI that each percentage point of foreign sales contributes 0.005 to foreign exposure.  
For direct exposure to foreign stocks, the upper bound estimate is U.S. investors’ portfolio holdings of 
foreign equities as constructed by Thomas, Warnock, and Wongswan (2004); the lower bound 
estimate subtracts the market capitalization of U.S. holdings of foreign equities that could owe to U.S. 
operations; and the model based assumes that 50 percent of non-U.S. firms’ foreign operations are in 
the US (and that the relationship between sales and foreign exposure is as in Table VI).  The size of 
the US equity portfolio is calculated as US market capitalization minus foreigners’ holdings of US 
stocks plus US holdings of foreign stocks. 
 
Home-Grown Foreign Exposure     
  upper bound  $3531 billion   
  model based  $1766 billion   
       
Direct Exposure to Foreign Stocks     
  upper bound  $2074 billion   
  lower bound  $1343 billion   
  model based  $1891 billion   
       
Total Exposure (model based)    % of US Equity 
Portfolio 
  Direct only  $1891 billion  11% 
  Direct and Home-Grown  $3657 billion  21% 





  32 
Figure 1









1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
(%)
in world portfolio in US portfolios
 
Notes.    The  share  of  foreign  (i.e.,  non-U.S.)  equities  in  the  world  portfolio  is  calculated  as  U.S.  market 
capitalization divided by global market capitalization.  For the share of foreign equities in U.S. portfolios, the 
size of the foreign equity portfolio is from the BEA’s International Investment Position data and the size of the 
U.S. portfolio is calculated as U.S. market capitalization less foreigners’ holdings of U.S. equities plus U.S. 
investors’  foreign  equity  holdings.    Market  capitalization  data  are  from  S&P’s  Emerging  Stock  Markets 
Factbook (various issues). 
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Figure 2







1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
(%)
in US portfolios with adjustments
 
Notes.  For the share of foreign equities in U.S. portfolios, the size of the foreign equity portfolio is from the 
BEA’s International Investment Position data and the size of the U.S. portfolio is calculated as U.S. market 
capitalization less foreigners’ holdings of U.S. equities plus U.S. investors’ foreign equity holdings.  Market 
capitalization data are from S&P’s Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (various issues).  Adjustments to U.S. 
investors’ foreign equity portfolio include the addition of one-half of reported U.S. direct investment abroad and 
the subtraction of 10 percent of U.S. investors’ reported foreign equity holdings.  
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Figure 3







1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
(%)
in foreign portfolios with adjustments
Notes.  For the share of U.S. equities in foreign portfolios, the size of the U.S. equity portfolio is from the 
BEA’s International Investment Position data and the size of the foreign portfolio is calculated as non-
U.S. market capitalization less foreigners’ holdings of non-U.S. equities plus foreign investors’ U.S. 
equity holdings.  Market capitalization data are from S&P’s Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (various 
issues).  Adjustments to foreign investors’ foreign equity portfolio include the addition of one-half of 
reported foreign direct investment in the US and the subtraction  of  10  percent  of foreign investors’ 
reported U.S. equity holdings. 